

DEIXIS I

In my lecture on the sentence "May we come in?" I spoke about lexical items and grammatical forms which can be interpreted only when the sentences in which they occur are understood as being anchored in some social context, that context defined in such a way as to identify the participants in the communication act, their location in space, and the time during which the communication act is performed. Aspects of language which require this sort of contextualization are what I have been calling *deictic*. In my second and third lectures I spoke about the non-deictic semantics of expressions which serve to locate objects and events in *space* and *time*. Today I will talk about deictic space and time expressions. My next lecture on deixis will cover *social* and *discourse* deixis.

One way to become clear about the importance of deictic anchoring is to consider a variety of cases in which messages can be correctly interpreted only if they are properly anchored in a communication situation, but where there are mistakes or uncertainties about the nature of this anchoring.

Suppose, first, that you are a young lady who has just heard a wolf whistle, and you feel like letting the wolf know that you resent what he did. There are two uncertainties in this situation, one of them being that you can't be sure who emitted the whistle, the second being that you may not have been the addressee of the compliment. To turn around and scowl is to acknowledge that you believe the message was intended for you, and that may be taken as presumptuous. The meaning of the message is fairly clear, but what is uncertain is the identity of the sender and that of the intended receiver.

Here is another case. Suppose that you are looking for somebody in the place where he works, and when you get to his office you find taped to his door a sign which reads "back in two hours". The message is clear, you can probably be pretty sure who the sender of the message was,

and you can properly consider yourself included in the set of intended receivers of the message. This time, however, an important bit of information is missing, namely the time at which the message was written.

Consider a third case. Herb Clark has brought to my attention some experiments that were conducted with preschool children communicating with each other across a barrier. They could hear each other, but they could not see each other. Each child had in front of him an array of blocks, and the experiment was to see how well children of different ages could communicate with each other by linguistic means alone. One child was told how to assemble the blocks to make a particular figure, and his job was to teach the child on the other side of the barrier how to do the same thing. It was not uncommon, Clark tells me, for the one child to say, "Put this block on top of that one," for the other then to say, "You mean this one?" and for the first to reply, "Yes."

This is characteristic of what Piaget refers to as the egocentric speech of children under the age of about seven. What is important for us to notice is that the children were using demonstratives in contexts requiring gestures that should have been monitored by their conversation partners, but neither sender nor receiver apparently sensed that need.

Take another case. Suppose this time that you are in a large building whose echoing properties you are not familiar with, and you are trying to locate somebody you believe to be in this building. You call out, "Yoo-hoo, Jimmy, where are you?" and you hear Jimmy's voice coming from somewhere saying "I'm right here." You know that he is telling the truth, but unless you can tell where his voice is coming from, you still don't know where he is. You call him again, and he says, somewhat impatiently this time, "I'm right here." Eventually you may find him, but in the process you will have learned that the only function of a sentence like "I'm right here" is that of emitting a noise that will somehow help people guess where you are. Counting aloud to three would do just as well.

The worst possible case I can imagine for a totally unanchored occasion-sentence is that of finding afloat in the ocean a bottle containing a note which reads, "Meet me here at noon tomorrow with a stick about this big."

There are many less obvious examples of anchoring mistakes and confusions that one can think of. A sentence like "The farmer killed the duckling," which is the way people usually remember the Sapir sentence I mentioned in my first lecture, can only be properly uttered in a discourse context in which the reference time reflected in the simple past tense of the verb has been identified in the preceding context, as well as the identity of a particular farmer and a particular duckling. People who feel that biblical injunctions ought to be obeyed should pay attention to who the injunctions were addressed to. What they fail to realize is that when the intended addressee of a command complies with the command, the command no longer stands. The biblical command, "Be fruitful and multiply," has been complied with, in spades, and nobody living today can consider himself or herself among the intended receivers of that message. The earth has been replenished and subdued.

Deixis is the name given to those formal properties of utterances which are determined by, and which are interpreted by knowing, certain aspects of the communication act in which the utterances in question can play a role. These include (1) the identity of the interlocutors in a communication situation, covered by the term *person deixis*; (2) the place or places in which these individuals are located, for which we have the term *place deixis*; (3) the time at which the communication act takes place—for this we may need to distinguish as the *encoding time*, the time at which the message is sent, and as the *decoding time*, the time at which the message is received—these together coming under the heading of *time deixis*; (4) the matrix of linguistic material within which the utterance has a role, that is, the preceding and following parts of the discourse, which we can refer to as *discourse deixis*; and (5) the social relationships on the part of the participants in the conversation, that determine, for example, the choice of honorific or polite or intimate or in-sulting speech levels, etc., which we can group together under the term *social deixis*.

Today, as I said, I will be speaking mainly about place deixis and time deixis; in the final lecture I will have something to say about social deixis and discourse deixis, and I will include remarks on person deixis

in my discussion of social deixis. There are certain person deictic categories, however, which are relevant to the description of both place deixis and time deixis, and I will identify these briefly now.

There is, first of all, the speaker of the utterance, the *sender* of the message, what grammarians call the "first person"; there is, secondly, the *addressee* of the message or utterance, the message's intended recipient, what we usually refer to as the "second person"; there is a third category of person deixis which is seldom included in discussions of pronoun systems or person markers in languages, presumably because it seldom has obvious reflexes in the morphology of a language, but which plays a role nevertheless—I have in mind the intended *audience*, by which I mean a person who may be considered part of the conversational group but who is not a member of the speaker/addressee pair. The three categories of person deixis that I will be talking about, then, are *speaker*, *addressee*, and *audience*. (Out of habit I use the word "speaker" even though I mean "sender.") Other individuals referred to in sentences can be identified negatively with respect to these three categories as being, for example, somebody who is neither speaker nor addressee, or somebody who is neither speaker nor addressee nor audience.

The most obvious place-deictic terms in English are the adverbs "here" and "there" and the demonstratives "this" and "that", along with their plural forms; the most obvious time-deictic words are adverbs like "now" or "today".

There are important distinctions in the uses of these and other deictic words which I would like us to be clear about right away. I will frequently need to point out whether a word or expression that I am referring to can be used in one or more of three different ways, and these I will call *gestural*, *symbolic*, and *anaphoric*. By the *gestural* use of a deictic expression I mean that use by which it can be properly interpreted only by somebody who is monitoring some physical aspect of the communication situation; by the *symbolic* use of a deictic expression I mean that use whose interpretation involves merely knowing certain aspects of the speech communication situation, whether this

knowledge comes by current perception or not; and by the *anaphoric* use of an expression I mean that use which can be correctly interpreted by knowing what other portion of the same discourse the expression is *coreferential* with.

I can illustrate the distinction I'm talking about by taking the word "there". It has all three uses. Its gestural use can be seen in a sentence like, "I want you to put it there." You have to know where the speaker is pointing in order to know what place he is indicating. The symbolic use is exemplified in the telephoner's utterance, "Is Johnny there?" This time we understand the word "there" as meaning "in the place where you are." An example of the anaphoric use of "there" is a sentence like "I drove the car to the parking lot and left it there." In that case the word refers to a place which had been identified earlier in the discourse, namely the parking lot.

Take another example, this time one showing just the distinction between the gestural and the symbolic use. If during my lecture you hear me use a phrase like "this finger", the chances are fairly good that you will look up to see what it is that I want you to see; you will expect the word to be accompanied by a gesture or demonstration of some sort.

On the other hand, if you hear me use the phrase "this campus", you do not need to look up, because you know my meaning to be "the campus in which I am now located", and you happen to know where I am. The former is the gestural use, the latter the symbolic use.

One way to become sensitive in a hurry to the role of deixis-accompanying gestures is to have conversations with blind people, and with deaf people who can read lips. When you are talking with blind people, you detect instantly that gestures which require your interlocutor to see what you are doing are impossible. This is sensed as an inconvenience, but the nature of the problem can be mastered instantly. In conversations with a deaf person who can read lips, the fact that he can see you may cause you to rely on gestures more than you normally would, since gestures are generally an aid to communication. It is easy to forget that your addressee cannot look at what you are pointing at and simultaneously read your lips. If you want to talk about, say, a city

on a map, you can point to the map, but then you must wait for him to look back at your lips again before you can resume talking.

There are not very many deictic expressions which function gesturally only. Possibly the so-called *presentatives* are like that, for example, the "voici" and "voilà" of French or the "voť" and "von" of Russian. In English, as far as I can tell, the only word which is obligatorily accompanied by a gesture is the nonstandard size-demonstrating word "yea" as in "She's about yea tall."

Place indications take part in the deictic system of a language by virtue of the fact that for many locating expressions, the location of one, or another, or both, of the speech act participants can serve as a spatial reference point. Sometimes all that means is that for an expression which in a nondeictic use requires mention of a reference object, in its deictic use the reference object, taken to be the speaker's body at the time of the speech act, simply goes unmentioned.

Take, for example, the expression "upstairs". If I say, "Johnny lives upstairs," you will understand me as meaning upstairs of the place where I am at the time I say the sentence, unless the immediately preceding discourse has provided some other reference point. If I say "Harry lives nearby," the same can be said. You will understand that Harry lives near to the place where I am when I say the sentence, again, except for the case where a reference point has been identified in the immediately preceding discourse.

For words that can refer to areas or spaces, the word "this" followed by the appropriate noun locates an object as being in the same area as the speaker is at coding time. Thus I can talk about something being "in this room", "on this planet", "in this city", etc. In the Fijian language, I am told, the choice of different prepositions has that same function. If I want to say, in Fijian, that somebody is in a certain town, I will choose one word for "in" if I am in that same town, another if I am not.

The English adverb "here", when used for locating objects, is paraphrasable as "in this place", "at this place", etc., in either the gestural or the symbolic use of "this". The scope of the word "here" is as general, or as vague, as the scope of the noun "place". With the scope usually deter-

minable from the subject matter, I can use the word "here" to mean anything from "at this point" to "in this galaxy".

Systems of place-deictic adverbs and demonstratives seem to be of various types, according to the number of distinct terms that can be used. In English we have a two-way contrast shown in the pair "this" versus "that", though we also have the archaic forms "yon" and "yonder". In a number of languages, the system of contrasts involves three terms, as with the Japanese "kore", "sore", and "are". One is told that Tlingit is a language with a four-way contrast, translatable, I suppose, as "right here", "right there", "over there", and "way the heck over there".

The various terms in these systems may differ according to whether they can be used gesturally, symbolically, or anaphorically. There may be differences, in fact, between the adverbs and the demonstratives in this regard, even though both might have the same number of terms. And there can be differences from one dialect to another. For example, in standard Japanese, the two distal locative adverbs, namely "soko" and "asoko", differ in that while both can be used gesturally, only "soko" can be used anaphorically. There appear to be dialect differences with respect to this observation, analogously, I suppose, to the differences in Scots dialects between those in which the word "yonder" can be used only when the object being located is presently visible, and those which do not require this.

It is frequently the case that if a language has two or more terms in its system of place-deictic categories, one of these will identify the location of the speaker, or the speaker and addressee as a group, and one can indicate the location of the addressee whenever the addressee's location is taken as being distinct from that of the speaker. This latter appears to be one of the functions of the middle category for such languages as Japanese, Spanish, or Tagalog, but the words seem to have so many other functions, as well, that it is difficult to be absolutely clear about the reference to the conversation partners.

I have heard of one language, Samal, with place-deictic terms which separately indicate the position of the speaker, the addressee, the audience, and "none of the above". In this language, spoken in the Philip-

piners and studied by Bill Geoghegan, there are separate place deictic expressions for "near me", "near you", "near other participants in our conversation" and "away from all of the above". The way Geoghegan explained it to me, if A is talking to B and C is a part of their conversational group, A will use one deictic category for locating things which are near C; if C is not a part of the conversational group, as might be the case if he has fallen asleep or if A and B are whispering or if C has picked up a newspaper or has started talking to somebody else, then A must use the fourth place-deictic category instead of the third.

When I talked about non-deictic place indications, I discussed the various terms that depend on the understanding of something being oriented in space in a particular way, and it was in this connection that I examined expressions like "in front of", "behind", "above", "below", "to the left side of", and "to the right side of". The way we understood these expressions, especially those connected with the horizontal dimensions, depended on how we imputed an orientation in space to the reference object. These expressions have additionally a use that shows up in deictically anchored situations. In particular, the location of the speaker and his outlook on the world can determine the orientation of the objects around him. From the fact that we can speak of "the side of the tree *facing me*", we see that even things which do not have front/back orientation of their own can be thought of as having their *front* close to the observer. If there is a kitten on the ground close to a tree, and close to the side which "faces" me, I can say that there is a kitten "in front of" the tree.

If there is a dog on the opposite side of the tree I can say that it is "behind" the tree. Notice that these expressions cannot be interpreted apart from knowing where I am at the time I utter the sentences. In this egocentric way of recognizing orientation in space, "left" and "right" are defined from the observer's point of view.

Thus, if the dog and the cat should walk ninety degrees widdershins around the tree, I can then speak of the dog as being on the left side of the tree and the kitten on the right side of the tree.

The conditions that I have mentioned so far are satisfactory for

thinking aloud, but for deictic locating expressions involving notions like "front", "back", "left", and "right", the speaker must also be aware of his addressee's point of view. He can use these abbreviated expressions only when speaker and hearer are oriented toward the object in the same way. Thus, if I ask you "What's the shiny object out there to the left of the cypress tree?" I've spoken appropriately only if you and I are both oriented toward these objects in the same way; it is inappropriate if the tree is between us and I am talking to you over the telephone. In situations in which I recognize that your point of view may be different from mine, I must use expressions which show that fact, such as expressions as "to your right", or "on the right side as you face it".

I have spoken here about spatial orientation concepts which are defined from the speaker's point of view. It should be clear that it is also possible for the speaker of a sentence to regard his own body as a physical object with an orientation in space; expressions like "in front of me", "behind me", or "on my left side", are deictic by containing a first person pronoun but they are not instances of the deictic use of the orientational expressions.

Place deixis plays a role in description of movement verbs in ways that I suggested in the first lecture, and there is much to say about that particular class of verbs. In fact, I plan to take up problems connected with coming and going, coming and going home, and coming and going away, in a later lecture. There are many ways of using place-deictic terms that reflect what might be called *taking the other fellow's point of view*. I'll discuss these matters when I talk about social deixis. There are special uses of place-deictic terms in third-person narratives. I'll take that up in a lecture on discourse.

The category needed for time deixis, as I mentioned earlier, is what we might call *coding time*. By coding time I mean, in general, the time of the "communication act", but of course there is some unclarity in that expression. In particular, there is a need to distinguish encoding time from decoding time, to talk about a number of problems connected with messages that are not sent and received at the same time; and there is the problem of knowing whether the coding time is under-

stood broadly as the time during which the utterance as a whole is being produced, or the precise time at which the deictic time word is being uttered. Just as the same gestural element can occur in accompaniment with two or more different gestures in a single sentence, as with "I want you to put *this* block on top of *this* one," the word "now" can be used in two voice gestural ways in a single utterance, as, for example, "Now you see it, now you don't."

In general anyway, the main purpose of the proximal deictic time category is that of identifying a particular time as coinciding with, being close to, or being contained in the same larger time unit as, the moment of speech, or the coding time. The terms past, present, and future refer to times earlier than, coinciding with, or later than, the time of the speech act. Here too, the notion "time of the speech act" has an undesired vagueness. One can imagine a skillful dentist extracting a loose tooth saying something like "This won't take long, did it?" For the interpretation of that sentence we would have to assume that whatever took place happened after the dentist started talking and before he finished talking.

We can talk about something occurring simultaneously with the speech act, or as having an extent which includes the moment of the speech act, as in "I want you to turn the corner ... right ... now" for the first case, or "John lives in Chicago now," for the second case.

There is a general vagueness associated with "now" like what we found for "here", but again the word "right" can narrow things down a bit. As we could say "right here", we could also say "right now". Again, in the expression with "right", the addressee is assumed to be monitoring the message as it is being produced, and is therefore able to identify the intended time point. There is another narrowing word, "just", as in "just now", but it is generally used to indicate a short period of time *before* the coding time. In Russian the word "sejchas" can be used to refer to a time period either immediately before or immediately after the coding time, and therefore it has the function of both "just now" and "right away". American tourists in Russia are sometimes confused by the fact that so many guides translate the Russian "sejchas" consis-

tently into "just now", and use it to refer to times which immediately follow the speech act time as well as those which immediately precede. "We'll visit the mausoleum just now."

Time periods that are located at measured or unmeasured distances earlier than or later than the coding time call for adverbs like "recently" or "soon", or measurement expressions like "three days ago" or "ten years from now". For something which continues from the moment of speech into the future, the word "henceforth" is appropriate; for something which is going to occur at a particular time in the future, an expression like "later on" is appropriate. The full story will reveal a large number of interesting differences between time-indicating expressions depending on whether they are used deictically. Some occur only in deictic expressions. "After a while" can be used either deictically or non-deictically, but "in a while" is used only deictically, and "after a while" is at least most natural when used deictically. I can say "I'll do that in a while," but not "I did it in a while." Expressions of later time having the form "in" plus "a" plus the name of a noncalendric time unit are used in nondeictic contexts only with completive aspect verbs, but in a deictic context they can indicate a period before the end of which the thing will happen. Thus, if I say "I did it in an hour" the meaning is that it took me an hour to do it, and that I finished doing it; if I say "I'll do it in an hour" it can have that use, but it can also mean that I'll do it before an hour runs out, even if I don't start doing it until 45 minutes from now.

We noticed in the discussion of place deixis that there were ways of locating something within the same area as the speaker, as in an expression like "in this town", or "in this room". Similarly, there are expressions indicating the time of an event as occurring within the same time unit as the moment of the speech act, and, once again, the demonstrative "this" is called for. I must remind you here of the difference between calendric and noncalendric time units, and the difference between positional and nonpositional calendric units. If I wish to locate the time of an event within the same calendric nonpositional unit as the moment of speech, I use the word "this" with the name of that unit,

with certain special qualifications regarding the day-length units. If something happened or is to happen "this week", its occurrence is in the same week as the coding time of the utterance; for something which happens "this month", "this year", or "this century", again the pattern is the same: its occurrence is placed within the same calendric unit as the moment of speech.

For the positional calendric units, matters are slightly different. If I say that something happened or is to happen "this August", I am saying that it will occur within the August period of the calendar year which contains the coding time. If I speak of something occurring on "this Thursday", I speak of it as occurring on a Thursday of the calendar week which also contains the coding time. For the months of the year, the interpretation is fairly straightforward, because the full sequence of month names is included within a calendar year, so that there is no confusion about the identity of the first month and the last month. With the days of the week, however, things are a bit tricky, for two reasons. One is the uncertainty over whether the week begins with Sunday or Monday, the other is the dialect difference between speakers of English who do or do not use "this" plus a weekday name only for identifying times which are within the same calendar week but are later than the coding time. With the names of the seasons and with the subdivisions of the twenty-four hour day, however, it is not always clear what the larger including unit is. If I say "this afternoon", everybody knows that I am talking about the afternoon of the day which includes the coding time, and if I say "this summer", everybody knows that I am talking about something taking place during the summer of the calendar year which includes the coding time, but since there is a year change during the winter and a day change during the night, expressions like "this winter" and "this night" (except when resolved by the tense of the accompanying verb) are potentially ambiguous when spoken during any other time of the year or the day.

There are also ways of locating an event with respect to the coding time as occurring in a calendric unit which is at such and such a distance from the calendric unit that includes the coding time. In English

the word "next" indicates the unit which follows the current unit, "last" indicates the unit which precedes the current unit, the locutions "after next" and "before last" being usable for the calendric units that are two units away, in the past and in the future, from the current one. Thus we have "this week", "next week", "week after next", or "last week", "week before last". This pattern holds for weeks, months, years, as well, I suppose, as less commonly used units such as decades and centuries.

Some of the deictic calendric units are given separate lexicalizations, and these may be different from language to language.

In English, for example, instead of "this day" we have "today"; instead of "next day" we have "tomorrow" and so on. For the day subdivisions we have "this afternoon", "this morning", "this evening", but a separate lexicalization for "this night", namely "tonight". (The "night" that is lexicalized in "tonight" is the "night" period that is seen as being a part of the calendar day. In this way "tonight" differs from the expressions "last night" or "night before last".) Many languages have a richer set of lexicalizations for the deictic day names than English does, having, for example, separate words for yesterday, day before yesterday, the day before the day before yesterday, etc. The Persian system goes two days ahead and four days back; Japanese goes three days ahead and three days back and so does Russian; Vietnamese goes three days ahead and four days back; Chinantec goes four days ahead and four days back. The deictic day subdivisions might be separately lexicalized. In many languages, the word for "this morning" or "this evening" is a separate lexical item.

In Chinantec, there is a separate lexical item for yesterday afternoon, and another separate lexical item for the afternoon of the day before yesterday.

Sometimes you will find a separate way of indicating a positional deictic unit depending on whether that unit contains the moment of speech or not. In English, we can say "this morning" during the morning or later on during the day. In Chinantec, on the other hand, there is one way of saying "this morning" during the morning, another way of saying it during the rest of the day.

English has something analogous to that with the names of the days of the week. There are two uses of expressions having the form "this" plus a weekday name. One is that of identifying the day as a whole, and in this usage there are no restrictions on which day of the week it can be used. Thus, if I am talking about the current Wednesday and I am speaking on that Wednesday, I can say something like "This Wednesday the weather is a lot better than last Wednesday"; but, assuming that I know today is Wednesday, I would not say "I am planning to have dinner in Santa Cruz this Wednesday". The reason seems to be that the deictic day words, namely, "today", "tomorrow", "yesterday", seem to have priority over these other expressions when you are locating the time of some event. Thus, for example, if I know it is Wednesday when I am talking, and I wish to speak of something that is to happen on the following day, it is not appropriate for me to say that it is going to happen "this Thursday", but I must say that it is going to happen "tomorrow".

I mentioned that there is one set of conventions followed by many speakers of English by which the dating expressions of the form "this" followed by a weekday name are used only of times which follow, within the same week, the coding time. For speakers of this dialect, because of the priority of the deictic day names, there is never any need for the expression "this Monday", and none of these expressions can be used on a Saturday. This is true no matter where your week begins, because if your week ends on Saturday, there are no following days within the same week, and if your week ends on Sunday, the only day which follows Saturday is its immediate successor, and that calls for the word "tomorrow" rather than "this Sunday".

Expressions like "this Friday" or "this April" identify, in dating expressions, a positional unit within the same larger calendar unit as the coding time. Without the use of the demonstratives, expressions like "in April" or "on Friday" can be used in dating something within the named positional unit which is at a distance from the coding time or less than one noncalendric larger unit, in either the future or the past depending on the tense of the clause. Thus, if on Monday I say "I saw

her on Friday", I am talking about the immediately preceding Friday; if I say "I'll see her on Friday," I am talking about the immediately following Friday.

The use of the words "next" and "last" with the positional calendric terms has speakers of English divided into an uncountable number of subdialects, and I believe the best thing to do is to leave this subject untouched.

The tense systems of a number of languages do more than simply indicate the "direction" in earlier or later time of the event but sometimes make some reference to a calendric unit. Thus, as I learned from SIL linguist Robert Russell, the Amahauca language of Peru has one tense form which identifies a period since the last full moon, and it has another tense form which means "yesterday" if it is pronounced during the morning but means "this morning" if it is pronounced later on in the day.

Digression: While I am on the subject of the ways in which the use of a linguistic expression requires the speaker's awareness of the time of day, I should point out that the traditional greetings in a great many languages are selected according to the time of day, as, for example, English "good morning" and "good afternoon" and the like. The one example of a naming expression whose appropriateness is determined by the time of day in which it is used is an example I have from Charles Ferguson and which I have managed to bring into every lecture I've ever given on the subject of deixis. In Moroccan Arabic there are two words for needle; one of them is used only in the morning, and the other is used during the rest of the day.

In my discussion of time, I referred many times to the property of its being unidirectional. It happens that with a number of deictic expressions of time, this unidirectionality is ignored. In a great many languages, for example, the word for "yesterday" is the same as the word for "tomorrow", the word for "the day before yesterday" being the same as the word for "the day after tomorrow" and so on. Hindi is one such language. It is typical of the Shiria languages of South America that

their tenses are determined independently of the difference between past and future. The tense system in these languages distinguishes such notions as a period a few minutes from the moment of speech, a period within the same calendar day as the moment of speech, a period within a few days of the moment of speech, a period significantly more remote than that, etc., but all independently of past and future.

I mentioned earlier that many locutions about time involve spatial metaphors based on the notion of movement. It is on the moving world version of the metaphor that we can speak of the future as being ahead and the past as being behind; it is the moving time version of the metaphor which gives Vietnamese its time expressions, "the week ahead" for "last week" and "the week behind" for "next week", and so on. In English, too, we speak of "this coming Tuesday", suggesting the image that Tuesday is moving towards us, not that we are moving towards it.

An expression like "Summer has come and gone" is based on the same image.

I will say more about coming and going in the next lecture, and I will say more about tense in the final lecture. Situations for which encoding time and decoding time need to be distinguished will be mentioned in my discussion of social deixis, under the general heading of taking the other fellow's point of view. At the end of my second lecture on deixis I will summarize the uses of demonstratives in English.

Twenty-five years later: There are now lots of things to read on the topics taken up in this chapter. Erving Goffman (1979)¹ makes a number of distinctions about the ways in which one can participate in a speaking event. Clifford Hill has done numerous studies on both language-dependent and situation-dependent ways of treating non-oriented reference objects in locating expressions (Hill 1975, 1978).² J. Peter Denny has described the elaborate demonstrative system of the Inuktitut lan-

1. Erving Goffman, *Footing*, *Semiotica* 25:1-29 (1979).

2. Clifford A. Hill, *Variation in the Use of Front and Back by Bilingual Speakers*, in *Pro-*

guage (Denny 1980).³ I have treated some issues in the description of demonstrative categories in Fillmore (1982).⁴ Geoffrey Nunberg has clarified many of the problems associated with the "anchoring" of certain implicit-anchor temporal or spatial terms such as "local", "recent", etc., in Nunberg (1993).⁵ There are several collections of studies of deictic systems and deictic practices, e.g., Jarvella and Klein (1982),⁶ Rauh (1983),⁷ and Morel and Danon-Boileau (1992).⁸

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3. J. Peter Denny, *Semantics of the Inuktitut (Eskimo) spatial deictics*, *Research Bulletin* No. 352 (Department of Psychology, Western Ontario University, 1980).

4. Charles J. Fillmore, *Towards a descriptive framework for spatial deixis*, in *Speech, Place and Action: Studies in deixis and related topics* ed. Robert J. Jarvella and Wolfgang Klein (Chichester: Wiley, 1982).

5. Geoffrey Nunberg, *Indexicality and Deixis*, *Linguistics and Philosophy* 7:243-286 (1993).

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8. Mary-Annick Morel and Laurent Danon-Boileau, eds., *La Deixis* (Colloque en Sorbonne: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992).